22 janvier 2014
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1760-7507
All rights reserved , info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Robert Shaver, « Utilitarianism and Egoism in Sidgwickian Ethics », Revue d’études benthamiennes, ID : 10.4000/etudes-benthamiennes.673
In his excellent Sidgwickian Ethics, David Phillips argues that Sidgwick’s argument for utilitarianism from the axioms is less successful than Sidgwick believes. He also argues that Sidgwick’s argument for egoism is more successful than this argument for utilitarianism. I disagree. I close by noting, briefly, a possible solution to an epistemological puzzle in Sidgwick that Phillips raises. I. Utilitarianism Phillips takes the argument for utilitarianism to have two premises: (U) The good of ...