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5 mai 2014
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intentionality perception hallucination Husserl Brentano meaning saying philosophy of language philosophy of mind intending dire vouloir-dire intentionnalité (voir aussi intentionalité) philosophie de l’esprit philosophie du langageCiter ce document
Walter Hopp, « Is Seeing Intentional? A Response to Travis », Methodos, ID : 10.4000/methodos.4108
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This is a response to Charles Travis's article "Is Seeing Intentional?" In it, I argue that while seeing differs from other intentional states in a variety of ways, seeing is indeed intentional, at least in the philosophically central sense of "intentional" introduced to us by Brentano and Husserl. Seeing is, quite often at least, the consciousness of something. I spend the majority of the paper discussing Travis's arguments that it is not, and providing reasons for thinking they are inconclusive. That seeings do not harbor ambitions and that "sees (NP)" is not an intensional context do not entail that seeings are not intentional. Furthermore, I argue that Travis's contention that states of seeing are relational is inconclusive, and also argue that even if that is so, the proper conclusion to draw is not that seeing is not intentional, but that some intentional states are relational.