Contextualism, But Not Enough

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10 janvier 2013

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Revus

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info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1581-7652

Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1855-7112

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Francesca Poggi, « Contextualism, But Not Enough », Revus, ID : 10.4000/revus.2214


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Résumé En Sl

This essay examines the pragmatically oriented theory of legal interpretation proposed by Vittorio Villa, arguing that, despite its originality and merits, this theory does not yet recognize the proper place for context. In particular, the author criticizes the thesis according to which meaning is a stratified concept, arguing that it does not describe actual practice or match with other parts of Villa’s conception. Moreover, the author claims that Villa’s brilliant intuitions about (legal) interpretation would be better developed if he had adhered to a more radical form of contextualism (i.e. a form of contextualism which admits, and which is able to account for the fact, that semantic and pragmatic factors influence each other so much that it is difficult to distinguish them and, in any case, pragmatic factors can overwhelm the semantic ones). According to the author, this would also allow Villa to account for some peculiarities of legal practice that do not seem to find a suitable role within his theory (at least at this stage of its development).

Premalo kontekstualizma. Kratka beležka o Villovem nauku o pravnem razlaganju. Članek obravnava Vittoria Ville pragmatično usmerjeni nauk o pravnem razlaganju, ki ga je slednji prvič predstavil v Revus (2010) 12. Ob priznavanju izvirnosti in odličnosti Villove teorije, avtorica utrjuje, da ta še vedno ne daje pravšnje vloge kontekstu oz. pomenotvornim okoliščinam. Posebej izpodbija predpostavko Ville, da je pomen plastovit pojem. Ta predpostavka naj bi, prvič, onemogočala opis določenih dejanskih praks, hkrati pa naj bi bila v neskadju z nekaterimi drugimi prvinami Villovega nauka. Avtorica meni, da bi bilo Villove odlične uvide v (pravno) razlaganje mogoče bolje povezati ob posvojitvi skrajnejše oblike kontekstualizma (tj. tiste oblike kontektualizma, ki priznava in dopušča pojasnitev dejstva, da imajo semantični in pragmatični dejavniki tako močne medsebojne vplive, da jih je težko razlikovati, četudi to storimo, pa ugotovimo, da pragmatični dejavniki semantične prežemajo). Avtorica trdi, da bi Villi to med drugim omogočilo razložiti tudi nekatere posebnosti pravne prakse, ki v njegovem nauku (vsaj doslej) še niso dobile ustreznega pojasnila.

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