Institutional concepts

Résumé En Sl

This paper proposes a reflection on specific kinds of legal concepts: those that delimit and allow us to identify legal institutions. In the first part, three proposals that are presented as competitive visions of these kinds of institutional concepts are taken into account: First is Ronald Dworkin's interpretative-justifying conception; second is the reductionist conception associated with the realistic theory of Alf Ross; finally, the criterial conception supported by a normative legal positivism. In the second part of the work, these three proposals are applied to a specific legal institution: the crime of witchcraft. The paper has two fundamental objectives: On the one hand, to show that the analytical and metatheoretical approach of normative legal positivism is not reducible to any of the other two and, in turn, relevant from a practical point of view. On the other hand, to show that the presentation of the considered proposals as if they were competing approaches to institutional concepts is misleading. They don't talk about the same thing. They are guided by different methodological objectives and, above all, answer different questions concerning legal institutions.

Institucionalni pojmi. Kritika redukcionističnega in interpretativističnega stališča. Predmet te razprave so institucionalni prvani pojmo, tj. pojmi, ki služijo prepoznavi in zamejitvi pravnih institucij. V prvem delu članka so predstavljeni trije različni pogledi na tovrstne institucionalne pojme: Dworkinovo interpretativno-utemeljevalno pojmovanje, redukcionistično pojmovanje povezano z Rossovo realistično teorijo prava in kriterijsko pojmovanje, ki je značilno za normativni pravni pozitivizem. V drugem delu članka to vsa tri pojmovanja uporabljena v pojasnitev iste pravne institucije, in sicer kaznivega dejanja čarovništva. Avtorica ima ob tem dva cilja. Po eni strani želi pokazati, da je analitični in meta-teoretični pristop normativnega pravnega pozitivizma praktično pomemben in obenem nezvedljiv na katero od drugih dveh pojmovanj. Po drugi strani opozarja, da je razumevanje omenjenih treh pristopov kot alternativ zavajajoče. Omenjeni pristopi namreč ne delijo istega predmeta, vodijo jih različnih metodološki cilji, predvsem pa so vprašanja o pravnih institucijah, na katera odgovarjajo, različna.