Constituent power(s) in a dualistic democracy

Résumé En Sl

I engage with Andrew Arato’s theory of constituent power explicated in The Adventures of Constituent Power and bring together two ideas introduced in the book – post-sovereign constituent power and dualistic democracy. I suggest that the combination of these two ideas allows us to extend the application of Arato’s theory. I contrast Arato’s ‘dualistic democracy’ with Bruce Ackerman’s well-known idea of dualist democracy in order to establish the differences of the two models and to criticize Arato for applying his theory of constituent power only to exceptional moments of constitution-making. I then develop the idea of the empty place of constituent power, unwrapping Claude Lefort’s influence over Arato’s theory. By introducing Lefort’s framework, I show how an understanding of dualistic democracy beyond Ackerman can allow to think of non-exceptional post-sovereign constituent power.

Konstitutivna oblast v dualistični demokraciji. Avtorica v kritičnem komentarju Aratove teorije ustavodajne oblasti iz knjige The Adventures of Constituent Power združi dve tam predstavljeni ideji: post-suvereno ustavodajno oblast in dualistično demokracijo. Trdi, da s kombinacijo teh dveh idej mogoče razširiti uporabnost Aratove teorije. Aratovo »dualistično demokracijo« primerja z Ackermanovim dualističnim modelom demokracije. Pri tem pokaže, da Arato svojo teorijo ustavodajne oblasti aplicira zgolj na izjemne trenutke ustavotvorja. Avtorica nato razvije idejo praznega prostora ustavodajne oblasti, s čimer razkrije vpliv, ki ga ima na Aratovo teorijo Claude Lefort. Z uvedbo Lefortovega okvirja pokaže, kako lahko z razumevanjem dualistične demokracije, ki gre dlje od Ackermana, osmislimo ne-izjemno post-suvereno ustavodajno oblast.