Earth, Wind, and Fire, and other dilemmas in A Theory of Legal Personhood – a vindication of legal conventionalism
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12 juin 2021
- doi: 10.4000/revus.6974
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legal personhood legal person analytical theory of law conventionalism institutional theory of law Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Alf RossSujets proches
Legislative acts Legislative enactments Acts, Legislative Enactments, Legislative Laws (Statutes)Citer ce document
Raimo Siltala, « Earth, Wind, and Fire, and other dilemmas in A Theory of Legal Personhood – a vindication of legal conventionalism », Revus, ID : 10.4000/revus.6974
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In his book A Theory of Legal Personhood (OUP, 2019), Visa Kurki provides a solid account of the historical and systemic elements of the theory of legal personhood in the Western legal tradition. He focuses on the presence or absence of the status of legal personhood in e.g., sentient animals, foetuses, algorithms, and slaves (historically speaking). Still, one key issue is left out of the scope of the book, viz. what do we need the concept of legal personhood for? This review scrutinizes Kurki’s book, providing several minor critiques along the way. It focuses on the above-mentioned problem and argues that instead of scrutinizing the status of legal personhood in some entity, we need to focus on the specific legal rights and duties allocated to such entities based on the legal facts – legal consequences that have been laid down in legislation and jurisdiction.