Conceptual analysis and the Coercion Thesis

Fiche du document

Date

13 décembre 2021

Discipline
Type de document
Périmètre
Langue
Identifiant
Source

Revus

Relations

Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1581-7652

Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/1855-7112

Organisation

OpenEdition

Licences

All rights reserved , info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess




Citer ce document

Frank Jackson, « Conceptual analysis and the Coercion Thesis », Revus, ID : 10.4000/revus.7594


Métriques


Partage / Export

Résumé 0

In chapter two of Coercion and the Nature of Law, Kenneth Himma sets his defence of the Coercion Thesis – the thesis that it is a conceptual truth, and not merely a practical necessity, that a legal system contains sanctions – within an account of the nature of conceptual analysis. I discuss his account, and the nature of conceptual analysis more widely, explaining why I follow Himma in accepting the Coercion Thesis. I conclude with a short discussion of where I think he misunderstands the distinction between modest conceptual and immodest conceptual analysis.

document thumbnail

Par les mêmes auteurs

Sur les mêmes sujets

Sur les mêmes disciplines

Exporter en