Trade, climate change, and the political game theory of border carbon adjustments

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19 décembre 2012

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info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2262-6565

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Danièle Revel, « Trade, climate change, and the political game theory of border carbon adjustments », Veille énergie climat, ID : 10.58079/oa1l


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Trade, climate change, and the political game theory of border carbon adjustments / Dieter Helm, Cameron Hepburn and Giovanni Ruta. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol 28 n°2, Summer 2012 The lack of real progress at the Durban climate change conference in 2011— postponing effective action until at least 2020—has many causes, one of which is the failure to  address trade issues and in particular carbon leakage. This paper advances two arguments. First, it argues that the conventional view ...

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