Privatization as bureaucratization: Contracts, accountability, and uses of law in the privatization of French prisons

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2024

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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.35295/osls.iisl.2019

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Nathan Rivet, « Privatization as bureaucratization: Contracts, accountability, and uses of law in the privatization of French prisons », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.35295/osls.iisl.2019


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Contemporary prison privatization has been the focus of many studies. While most research mainly looks at political factors and practical results, few have explored the organizational impact of outsourcing. Despite privatization being often seen as a sign of liberalization and deregulation, this article uses the French prison privatization example to highlight the connection between privatization and bureaucratization. Based on observation and interviews, this study makes three claims. First, it argues that prison privatization is a changing relationship between public and private sectors, leading to controversy over private accountability. Second, it suggests that outsourcing contracts create a new layer of law with public compliance officers becoming a new form of legal oversight. Third, it shows how these controllers enforce contract terms in their own interest, resulting in an adversarial legal culture between public and private services. The article concludes by suggesting a fresh approach to studying privatization using qualitative methods.

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