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- handle: 10670/1.06w6gz
- hal: hal-03263466
- doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.023
- WOS: 000437380400008
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.023
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Foreclosure Vertical Contracting Customer Segments Downstream Competition D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L12 - Monopoly • Monopolization Strategies L - Industrial Organization/L.L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies/L.L4.L42 - Vertical Restraints • Resale Price Maintenance • Quantity Discounts K - Law and Economics/K.K2 - Regulation and Business Law/K.K2.K21 - Antitrust LawSujets proches
Statutory foreclosure Mechanics' lien foreclosure Strict foreclosure Mortgage foreclosure Foreclosure sales Foreclosure--Law and legislationCiter ce document
Bruno Jullien et al., « Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.023
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Résumé
This paper analyzes a supplier's incentives to foreclose downstream entry when entrants have stronger positions in different market segments, thus bringing added value as well as competition. We first consider the case where wholesale contracts take the form of linear tariffs, and characterize the conditions under which the competition-intensifying effect dominates, thereby leading to foreclosure. We then show that foreclosure can still occur with non-linear tariffs, even coupled with additional provisions such as resale price maintenance.