Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling?

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2017

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Cairn.info

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Cairn

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Cairn



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Olivier Compte et al., « Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling? », Revue économique, ID : 10670/1.097bb1...


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We consider the issue of allotment design: goods are divisible and may be cut into various possibly heterogeneous lots. We investigate conditions under which it is preferable from the seller’s perspective to create two or more lots out of an initial one, or to group various initial lots into a single one. We identify two effects. De-grouping always increases efficiency of the final allocation. Nevertheless, it modifies asymmetries across bidders, and this may possibly end up hurting the seller. We examine the applications to procurement for cash flow management services, and to auctions for commercial links or space on internet.

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