1 janvier 2016
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, « A Reply to Céspedes’ Defense of Causal Contrastivism », Crítica (México, D.F.), ID : 10670/1.0aig2q
SUMMARY: In a recent article in this journal, Esteban Céspedes (2015) seeks to defend the contrastive account of singular causation from my criticisms (Steglich-Petersen 2012). Céspedes objects to my argument on three counts: (1) it is circular in presupposing a principle that it seeks to establish; (2) that same principle is false; and (3) even if the principle were true, it would not speak against the contrastive account. In this note I argue that all three objections are unconvincing.