Can they beat the Cournot equilibrium? Learning with memory and convergence to equilibria in a Cournot oligopoly
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15 octobre 2010
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.0b0b50...
- hal: hal-00526258
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Cournot oligopoly Learning Evolution Selection Evolutionary stability Nash Equilibrium CollusionSujets proches
Retention (Psychology) Learning process Balancing (Physics) Balance (Physics) Balance Scholarship LearningCiter ce document
Thomas Vallée et al., « Can they beat the Cournot equilibrium? Learning with memory and convergence to equilibria in a Cournot oligopoly », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10670/1.0b0b50...
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This article analyses the possibility of firms learning collusive solutions in a Cournot quantity game. Starting from the results of Vallée and Yildizoglu (2009) and of Alos-Ferrer (2004), we study the role of random experimenting, social learning (imitation), and (updated) memory in helping firms to discover more collusive market configurations than those of the Cournot equilibrium (CE). We show that long memory and its update is necessary to achieve such configurations.
