Fiche du document
- handle: 10670/1.0boz54
- halshs: halshs-04335830
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Simple games Coalitions Median graph Tree Intermediate preferences Condorcet D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting BehaviorSujets proches
Amusements Children--Recreation Games for children Pastimes Primitive games Recreations Games, Primitive Children's games Coalition (Social sciences)Citer ce document
Gabrielle Demange, « Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.0boz54
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
In a cooperative game, coalitions are the fundamental behavioral units. Stable outcomes (in the core) are those blocked by no coalition. This paper has two objectives. First, building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, I unify and extend previous results on the existence of stable outcomes in simple games. Second, I review how and when the core approach applies in more general settings and may help to predict the stable splitting of a whole group into disjoint coalitions