Fiche du document
2015
- handle: 10670/1.0c6kuu
- halshs: halshs-01226803
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Single-peaked preferences Maskin monotonicity Private good economies Strategy-proofness Unanimity C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • AssociationsSujets proches
Choice, Social Public choice Collective choiceCiter ce document
Mostapha Diss et al., « Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.0c6kuu
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
In this paper we establish the link between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We introduce a new condition and we prove that if this new property together with the requirement of citizen sovereignty are held, a social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it is unanimous. As an implication, we show that strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity become equivalent. We also give applications to implementation literature: We provide a full characterization for standard Nash implementation and partially honest Nash implementation and we determine a certain equivalence among these theories.