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2021
- handle: 10670/1.0edw18
- halshs: halshs-03515585
- doi: 10.1016/j.econmod.2021.105508
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.econmod.2021.105508
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Equilibrium Selection Trade Search C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O1 - Economic Development/O.O1.O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic DevelopmentSujets proches
Amusements Children--Recreation Games for children Pastimes Primitive games Recreations Games, Primitive Children's games Balancing (Physics) Balance (Physics) BalanceCiter ce document
Maurizio Iacopetta, « Class Di¤erences and the Commercial Revolution: An Equilibrium Selection Story », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10.1016/j.econmod.2021.105508
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Résumé
The reopening of the Mediterranean routes in the tenth century sparked, in some regions of Europe, a long period of economic boom. It also triggered a social change whereby some members of the nobility, despite their social status, turned to commerce. I explain these events through the lens a Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) model, extended to a two-country world. The response of the elite to a communication shock causes the economy to transit from a low-to a high-production equilibrium, if pre-existing class di¤erences are not too large. Quantitative experiments illustrate the view of economic historians that medieval expansion ensued in regions where the elite enjoyed relatively modest privileges and was slow in places, most notably France, where the elite's preoccupation for preserving the social-status was strong.