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2019
- handle: 10670/1.0f9get
- hal: hal-02121860
- PRODINRA: 468486
- WOS: 000504882300007
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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auto assurance clause du contratSujets proches
Insurance--Self-insurance Self-funding (Insurance)Citer ce document
Marielle Brunette et al., « On the uselessness of self-insurance clauses ? », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.0f9get
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Résumé
An insurer can monitor the policyholder's prevention effort when it is observable ex-post by using a contract clause. The literature on insurance contracts does not explicitly address the role of contract clauses. We examine the role of such clauses in case of self-insurance. Because of the substitutability between insurance and self-insurance, contract clauses focused on self-insurance investments could cause a possible deterrent effect on insurance demand, highlighting their puzzling nature. In a theoretical model, we examine two arguments to overcome the compulsory self-insurance clause paradox: the observability of the self-insurance investment and the role of the self-insurance clause on insurance demand. The fact that self-insurance investments are not observable ex-ante cannot justify the use of a mandatory clause. Neither the demand for insurance nor the demand for prevention is observability-dependent. Therefore, self-insurance clauses are, at best, useless, at worst, counterproductive: when binding, they reduce the size of the insurance market.