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- handle: 10670/1.0t0o4f
- halshs: halshs-03673242
- doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102795
- PII: S0167-7187(21)00087-4
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102795
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Antitrust Commitments Deterrence Legal learning L - Industrial Organization/L.L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies/L.L4.L41 - Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices K - Law and Economics/K.K2 - Regulation and Business Law/K.K2.K21 - Antitrust Law D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism DesignSujets proches
Learning process Scholarship LearningCiter ce document
Andreea Cosnita-Langlais et al., « Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102795
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Résumé
This paper examines the impact of commitment decisions on the efficiency of antitrust enforcement. We discuss the optimal use of commitments considering past rulings as a source of knowledge to better assess future similar antitrust cases. Our framework combines two key effects: the deterrence of the anticompetitive behavior by the different enforcement regimes, and the dynamic perspective through litigation as a source of learning. We show that if the level of penalty is high enough, the antitrust authorities undervalue the dynamic informational benefit of litigation and tend to over-use commitments.