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19 janvier 2023
- handle: 10670/1.0xypco
- hal: hal-03953201
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Employer-employee data Wage rigidity Reciprocity Workplace relations E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy/E.E2.E24 - Employment • Unemployment • Wages • Intergenerational Income Distribution • Aggregate Human Capital • Aggregate Labor Productivity E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E7 - Macro-Based Behavioral Economics/E.E7.E70 - General J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs/J.J3.J31 - Wage Level and Structure • Wage Differentials J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J4 - Particular Labor Markets/J.J4.J41 - Labor ContractsSujets proches
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Marco Fongoni et al., « When are wages cut? The roles of incomplete contracts and employee involvement », HALSHS : archive ouverte en Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société, ID : 10670/1.0xypco
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Résumé
We develop a model of incomplete employment contracts such that employees have some discretion over effort, which depends on their work morale. Nominal wage cuts have a strong negative effect on morale, while employee involvement in workplace decision-making tends to increase morale. We derive predictions on how these two mechanisms affect the decisions of firms to cut nominal wages. Using matched employer-employee and manager survey data from Great Britain, we find support for our model: nominal wage cuts are only half as likely when managers think that employees have some discretion over how they perform their work, but this reduced likelihood recovers partially when employees are involved in the decision-making process at their workplace.