Fiche du document
- handle: 10670/1.0y93ba
- halshs: halshs-03342906
- doi: 10.1257/mic.20180309
- WOS: 000677858600003
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/mic.20180309
Mots-clés
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting BehaviorSujets proches
Amusements Polls Children--Recreation Games for children Pastimes Primitive games Recreations Games, Primitive Children's games Distribution, Cooperative Cooperative distribution Cooperative movementCiter ce document
Antonin Macé et al., « Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1257/mic.20180309
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
We study the design of voting rules for committees representing heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when cooperation among groups is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting groups proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting for participation constraints entails overweighting some groups, those for which the incentive to cooperate is the lowest. When collective decisions are not enforceable, cooperation induces more stringent constraints that may require granting veto power to certain groups. In the benchmark case where groups differ only in their population size (i.e., the apportionment problem), the model provides a rationale for setting a minimum representation for smaller groups.