Fiche du document
6 janvier 2014
- handle: 10670/1.145bl6
- hal: hal-00924017
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
social tragedy Network strategic complements equilibrium efficiency social tragedy. A - General Economics and Teaching/A.A1 - General Economics/A.A1.A14 - Sociology of Economics C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: TheorySujets proches
Endeavor Effort Balancing (Physics) Balance (Physics) BalanceCiter ce document
Yann Rébillé et al., « Influence and Social Tragedy in Networks », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.145bl6
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
We model agents in a network game of strategic complements and negative externalities. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and of a unique social optimum are established. Under these conditions, we find that players with more vulnerable locations in the network exert more effort at equilibrium, and that the most influential players should exert less effort at efficiency. We then find structural conditions under which each player exerts strictly more effort than her efficient level, whether the social optimum be interior or not.