2015
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/ecoj.12241
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/EC/FP7/340903/EU/Cooperation and competition in vertical relations: the business strategies and industry oversight of supply agreements and buying patterns/COOPETITION
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Stéphane Caprice et al., « Buyer power from joint listing decision », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1111/ecoj.12241
We consider a model of vertically related markets, in which an upstream firm faces a competitive fringe of less efficient suppliers and negotiates with customers that compete in a downstream market. We allow downstream firms to form a buyer group which selects suppliers on behalf of its members. We show that transforming individual listing decisions into a joint listing decision makes delisting less harmful for a group member, which in turn enhances the group members’ bargaining position at the expense of the upstream firm. We also discuss the implication for upstream investment incentives.