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19 novembre 2012
- handle: 10670/1.14ekfq
- hal: hal-00753473
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Strategic Communication Hard Information Information Disclosure Masquerade Relation Belief Consistency Single Crossing Di erences Supermodular Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism DesignSujets proches
Amusements Children--Recreation Games for children Pastimes Primitive games Recreations Games, Primitive Children's gamesCiter ce document
Jeanne Hagenbach et al., « Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.14ekfq
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Résumé
This article asks when communication with certifiable information leads to complete information sharing. We consider Bayesian games augmented by a pre-play communication phase in which announcements are made publicly. We characterize the augmented games in which there exists a full disclosure sequential equilibrium with extremal beliefs (i.e., any deviation is attributed to a single type of the deviator). This characterization enables us to provide different sets of sufficient conditions for full information disclosure that encompass and extend all known results in the literature, and are easily applicable. We use these conditions to obtain new insights in senders-receiver games, games with strategic complementarities, and voting with deliberation.