The Originalism of American Federal Judges or the Establishment of Constitutional Foundations for Economic Liberalism since the 1970
Fiche du document
2023
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.193772...
- isbn: 9783031120732
- hal: hal-03879185
- doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-12074-9_9
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-12074-9_9
Mots-clés
droit sociologieSujets proches
Sixties (Twentieth century decade) 60s (Twentieth century decade) 1960s Economics and jurisprudence Economics and law Jurisprudence and economics Social science Sciences, Social Human sciences Social studies Behavioral sciences Mechanical perspective Linear perspective Architectural perspective Liberal egalitarianism Parliaments, Members of Lawmakers Members of parliaments Legislative acts Legislative enactments Acts, Legislative Enactments, Legislative Laws (Statutes) Alcaldes Chief magistrates Justices Magistrates Judges--Legal status, laws, etc Chief justices Cadis Paws Hands Paw Bias Use ofCiter ce document
Thierry Kirat et al., « The Originalism of American Federal Judges or the Establishment of Constitutional Foundations for Economic Liberalism since the 1970 », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10.1007/978-3-031-12074-9_9
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
American originalism, whatever its variants, participates in a conservative turn in constitutional interpretation contrasting with the progressive movement of the living constitution. During the 1960s and the Warren era of the Supreme Court, law was seized as a tool for social transformation, enabling progressists’ advances in individual rights and supporting federal policies aimed at regulating the economy. Originalism, on the other hand, whether conceived from the perspective of following the intentions of the lawmakers or respecting the letter of the text, has led to conservative decisions not only in societal matters but also in economic regulation. This chapter shows that despite their fundamental theoretical differences, originalism and the Chicagoan Law and Economics have favoured an under-enforcement of antitrust rules by introducing a pro-defendant bias. In addition, the use of originalist interpretation reveals to be quite teleological.
