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30 janvier 2008
- handle: 10670/1.1cbjwb
- halshs: halshs-00226656
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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Innovation information acquisition uncertainty self-control time inconsistency liability rulesSujets proches
Hours (Time) Self-mastery Self-discipline Bank discount Discount rateCiter ce document
Sophie Chemarin et al., « Innovation and information acquisition under time inconsistency and uncertainty », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.1cbjwb
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Résumé
This paper analyzes the impact of hyperbolic discounting preferences on theagent's information acquisition decision who wants to undertake a potentialdangerous activity for human health or the environment. We find that belowcertain discount rate threshold, an agent prefers ignoring information andcontinuing his project. On the other hand, above this threshold, it is optimal forhim to acquire information, and the investment for acquiring the information isincreasing with the discount rate. We then conclude that hyperbolic discountingpreferences limit the information acquisition. Moreover, we explain that the lackof self-control induced by hyperbolic discounting preferences also restraints theinformation acquisition. Finally, we analyze the efficiency of the strict liabilityrule and the negligence rule to motivate the agent to acquire information.