Fiche du document
2018
- handle: 10670/1.1ek8kh
- halshs: halshs-01937633
- doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.017
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.017
Mots-clés
Principal-agent models incentive theory non-monetary incentives goal setting reference-dependent utility laboratory experiments C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior D - Microeconomics/D.D2 - Production and Organizations/D.D2.D23 - Organizational Behavior • Transaction Costs • Property Rights M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M5 - Personnel Economics/M.M5.M54 - Labor ManagementSujets proches
Competence Goal setting Setting of goals Agency (Philosophy) Agents Person (Philosophy)Citer ce document
Brice Corgnet et al., « Goal Setting in the Principal-Agent Model: Weak Incentives for Strong Performance », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.017
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
We study a principal-agent framework in which principals can assign wage-irrelevant goals to agents. We find evidence that, when given the possibility to set wage-irrelevant goals, principals select incentive contracts for which pay is less responsive to agents' performance. We show that average performance of agents is higher in the presence of goal setting than in its absence despite weaker incentives. We develop a principal-agent model with reference-dependent utility that illustrates how labor contracts combining weak monetary incentives and wage-irrelevant goals can be optimal. It follows that recognizing the pervasive use of non-monetary incentives in the workplace may help account for previous empirical findings suggesting that firms rely on unexpectedly weak monetary incentives.