(Conceptual) Explanations in logic

Fiche du document

Date

6 mai 2024

Type de document
Périmètre
Langue
Identifiants
Collection

Archives ouvertes

Licence

info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess



Sujets proches En

Explanation (Philosophy)

Citer ce document

Francesca Poggiolesi, « (Conceptual) Explanations in logic », HAL-SHS : philosophie, ID : 10670/1.1mjgxt


Métriques


Partage / Export

Résumé 0

To explain phenomena in the world is a central human activity and one of the main goals of rational inquiry. There are several types of explanation: one can explain by drawing an analogy, as one can explain by dwelling on the causes (see e.g. see Woodward (2004)). Amongst these different kinds of explanation, in the last decade philosophers have become receptive to those explanations which explain by providing the reasons why a statement is true; these explanations are often called conceptual explanations (e.g. see Betti (2010)). The main aim of the paper is to propose a logical account of conceptual explanations. We will do so by using the resources of proof theory, in particular the sequent calculus. The results we provide not only shed light on conceptual explanations themselves, but also on the role that logic and logical tools might play in the burgeoning field of inquiry concerning explanations.

document thumbnail

Par les mêmes auteurs

Sur les mêmes sujets

Exporter en