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- handle: 10670/1.1v7diz
- hal: hal-03987359
- doi: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.12.001
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.12.001
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Litigation Papers Negotiations Bargaining Haggling Negotiating Higgling Dickering Funds Funding Impartiality Social costs External economies and diseconomies Costs, Social External effects (Economics) Proof Balancing (Physics) Balance (Physics) Balance Expenses Costs (Economics) Actions and defenses--Law and legislation Interpleader Litigation Personal actions Lawsuits Defense (Law) Suits (Law) Real actions Civil actions Finance, commerce, confiscations, etcCiter ce document
Mehdi Ayouni et al., « Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.12.001
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This paper analyzes how mandated information disclosure prior to settlement negotiations influences equilibrium outcomes when the privately informed party may misrepresent its type at a cost. We establish that private information cannot be fully revealed and that a regime without information sharing may outperform a regime with information sharing according to the criteria of expected social costs and fairness considerations.