INTENTIONNALITE DES EMOTIONS ET CONSCIENCE AFFECTIVE SELON FRANZ BRENTANO

Résumé En

One of the classical insights of Brentano's philosophy of intentional states is that there is a close relationship between intentionality and consciousness of mental states. As a consequence, this means that consciousness of emotions involves an immediate presentation of the presentation in which the "affective" mind is directed toward some object. Somehow differently, contemporary philosophical and psychological emotion theories are more interested in the experiential criterion of emotions, and, assuming that they acknowledge the inten-tionality criterion, the relation between conscious phenomenality and intentionality, in this case, is conceived of as an extrinsic relation. In this article, I propose an examination of Brentano's theory of affective states, and a short analysis of his criticisms against Hamilton's phenomenal view of affective states, in order to show that the Brentanian approach of the connexion between intentionality and consciousness could reveal difficulties and prejudices that contemporary theories have to face.