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- handle: 10670/1.21zvmj
- hal: hal-04038044
- doi: 10.1093/ej/ueac041
- WOS: 000855410900001
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/ej/ueac041
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Mots-clés
D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D73 - Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption P - Economic Systems/P.P0 - General/P.P0.P00 - General Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture/Q.Q1.Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure • Land Reform • Land Use • Irrigation • Agriculture and EnvironmentSujets proches
Surgical shock Urban politics Cities and towns--Government Municipal reform City government Municipalities Municipal administration Land Land utilization Utilization of land Use of land Pattern Model Global cities Towns Urban systems Municipalities Urban areas Methods of analysis Analysis and chemistry Analytical methods Chemical analysis Analysis methods Analysis and examinationCiter ce document
Leopoldo Fergusson et al., « Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1093/ej/ueac041
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Résumé
We develop a model of the politics of state capacity building undertaken by incumbent parties that have a comparative advantage in clientelism rather than in public goods provision. The model predicts that, when challenged by opponents, clientelistic incumbents have the incentive to prevent investments in state capacity. We provide empirical support for the model’s implications by studying policy decisions by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that affected local state capacity across Mexican municipalities and over time. Our difference-in-differences and instrumental variable identification strategies exploit a national shock that threatened the Mexican government’s hegemony in the early 1960s. The intensity of this shock, which varied across municipalities, was partly explained by severe droughts that occurred during the 1950s.