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- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.22af97...
- hal: hal-02452272
- doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.003
- WOS: 000506466300003
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https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01790947v1
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.003
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Optimal group targeting Aggregate effort Network Synergies C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: TheorySujets proches
Agency (Philosophy) Agents Person (Philosophy)Citer ce document
Mohamed Belhaj et al., « Group targeting under networked synergies », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.003
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Résumé
A principal targets agents organized in a network of local complementarities, in order to increase the sum of agents' effort. We consider bilateral public contracts à la Segal (1999). The paper shows that the synergies between contracting and non-contracting agents deeply impact optimal contracts: they can lead the principal to contract with a subset of the agents, and to refrain from contracting with central agents.
