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1 mars 2019
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.23c733...
- hal: hal-03393097
- SCIENCESPO: 2441/68ufmnnh3j9vmblf03huqt18qe
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/2441/68ufmnnh3j9vmblf03huqt18qe
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Short-time work Unemployment insurance Experience rating J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers/J.J6.J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers/J.J6.J65 - Unemployment Insurance • Severance Pay • Plant ClosingsSujets proches
Work, Method of Industry (Psychology) Method of workCiter ce document
Pierre Cahuc et al., « Inefficient Short-Time Work », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10670/1.23c733...
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Résumé
This paper shows that the reforms which expanded short-time work in France after the great 2008-2009 recession were largely to the benefit of large firms which are recurrent short-time work users. We argue that this expansion of short-time work is an inefficient way to provide insurance to workers, as it entails cross-subsidies which reduce aggregate production. An efficient policy should provide unemployment insurance benefits funded by experience rated employers’ contributions instead of short-time work benefits. We find that short-time work entails significant production losses compared to an unemployment insurance scheme with experience rating.
