FOREIGN MONOPOLY AND SELF-ENFORCING TARIFF AGREEMENTS UNDER INTEGRATED MARKETS: PRICES VERSUS QUANTITIES
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2009
- handle: 10670/1.2crlkj
- 0210-1521
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Investigaciones Económicas
Mots-clés
Economía y Finanzas Self rent integrated markets shifting hypothesis enforcing tariff agreementsSujets proches
Duties Customs duties Border taxes Customs (Tariff) Tariff on raw materials Fees, Import Import fees Import controls Ad valorem tariffCiter ce document
M. DOLORES ALEPUZ et al., « FOREIGN MONOPOLY AND SELF-ENFORCING TARIFF AGREEMENTS UNDER INTEGRATED MARKETS: PRICES VERSUS QUANTITIES », Investigaciones Económicas, ID : 10670/1.2crlkj
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Résumé
"This paper studies the stability of a tariff agreement among the importers of a monopolized good that is sold in an integrated market. The tariff agreement formation is modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, each importer decides whether or not to sign the agreement, and in the second stage the signatories choose cooperatively their tariffs whereas the non-signatories and the monopoly act in a non-cooperative way. Our findings show that the agreement consists of three countries regardless of whether the monopolist chooses the quantity or the price and the number of importers, provided that the parties to the agreement act as a leader in the second stage of the game."