To regulate congestion with prices: an application of a repeated random utility model to outdoor recreation
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3 juin 2010
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.2e4195...
- hal: hal-00729639
- PRODINRA: 36838
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
FRANCE Europe CONGESTION NASH EQUILIBRIUM RANDOM UTILITY MODEL regulation RECREATION DEMAND MODELISATION ECONOMIQUESujets proches
Balancing (Physics) Balance (Physics) BalanceCiter ce document
Melody Leplat et al., « To regulate congestion with prices: an application of a repeated random utility model to outdoor recreation », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10670/1.2e4195...
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Résumé
In France open access is the rule for recreational areas. This generally leads to suboptimal equilibrium of visitation due to congestion externality. Furthermore, congestion is a result of a Nash equilibrium. This assumption needs to be taken into account in econometric estimations and in welfare calculations. In our work, we explore some ways of regulating congestion by prices. Repeated random utility models are estimated on data about the visitation of 43 coastal sites from west France, using a procedure which ensures the consistency with the Nash equilibrium. Taxing only one site reduces the collective welfare because of substitution effects, whereas global taxation manages to maximise welfare due to participation reduction.
