Fiche du document
3 décembre 2014
- handle: 10670/1.2qbxpo
- halshs: halshs-01090241
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
doping sabotage feedback Status ranking competitive preferences experiment C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M5 - Personnel Economics/M.M5.M54 - Labor Management D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor/J.J2.J28 - Safety • Job Satisfaction • Related Public Policy J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs/J.J3.J31 - Wage Level and Structure • Wage DifferentialsSujets proches
Animal behavior Habits and behaviorCiter ce document
Gary Charness et al., « The Dark Side of Competition for Status (preprint) », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.2qbxpo
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare. We investigate experimentally the role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one’s performance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher when individuals are informed about their relative performance. However, ranking feedback also favors disreputable behavior. Some individuals do not hesitate to incur a cost to improve their rank by sabotaging others’ work or by increasing artificially their own performance. Introducing sabotage opportunities has a strong detrimental effect on performance. Therefore, ranking incentives should be used with care. Inducing group identity discourages sabotage among peers but increases in-group rivalry.