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2024
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.3306fd...
- hal: hal-05012232
- doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102218
- WOS: 001257553600001
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102218
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Uncertainty aversion Probabilistic sophistication Sources of ambiguity Ellsberg paradox C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty G - Financial Economics/G.G1 - General Financial Markets/G.G1.G11 - Portfolio Choice • Investment DecisionsSujets proches
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Daniel L. Chen, « Is ambiguity aversion a preference? Ambiguity aversion without asymmetric information », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1016/j.socec.2024.102218
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Résumé
Ambiguity aversion is the interpretation of the experimental finding (the Ellsberg paradox) that most subjects prefer betting on events whose probabilities are known (objective) to betting on events whose probabilities are unknown (subjective). However in typical experiments these unknown probabilities are known by others. Thus the typical Ellsberg experiment is a situation of asymmetric information. People may try to avoid situations where they are the less informed party, which is normatively appropriate. We find that eliminating asymmetric information in the Ellsberg experiment while leaving ambiguity in place, makes subjects prefer the ambiguous bet over the objective one, reversing the prior results.
