At first glance, it seems paradoxical to question the role and forms of friendship (philia) in the Phaedrus, a dialogue entirely devoted to love (erōs). I suggest, however, that the Phaedrus, even more than the Lysis, holds decisive lessons about the Platonic treatment of friendship and its specifically human approach (as opposed to the physical or cosmological approach of e.g. the Timaeus). One of the lessons to be drawn from the Phaedrus is that, despite the general approach of the dialogue, which raises the question of friendship in the context of homoerotic relationships, Plato, no less than Aristotle, distinguishes between forms, or types, of friendship and establishes a hierarchy between them in terms of excellence (aretē).To be convinced of this, we must begin by reading Lysias’ speech on love (erōtikos) (Phaedrus, 231a-234c) not as a document of no philosophical interest, but as the place where Plato expounds a conception of philia that he forcefully rejects and against which he will oppose an alternative model of friendly relationship. In Lysias’ speech, philia is radically distinguished from erōs : conceived as a contractual relationship, it appears to be the only form of relationship capable of promoting the interests of the beloved while guaranteeing the loveless lover the gains of a peaceful and rational sexual relationship. Socrates’first speech, in response to Lysias’, shows that this contract is a fool’s bargain, and that the loveless lover’s claim to realize the good of the beloved disguises his desire for sexual satisfaction, which makes the beloved an instrument of replenishment rather than a being loved for its own sake. Socrates’ second speech, the Palinode, then radically turns the table. The Palinode too distinguishes philia from erōs but shows that the former cannot be envisaged without the latter : it is not, therefore, the suppression of erōs that makes authentic philia possible, but its redirection towards the objects of true love and its sublimation beyond the infinite cycle of bodily desire and lack, a cycle which characterizes appetite according to Plato,Reading afresh parts of the Phaedrus along these lines will prompt us to considerably qualify some widely shared views, notably the one according to which Platonic ethics is built on a “cold-hearted egoism” (to use Gregory Vlastos’ famous phrase), making others a mere instrument in the individual pursuit of happiness. My purpose is essentially to reassess the place of friendship in Plato’s ethics, by comparing it to the eminent place which Aristotle’s ethics makes for it rather than measuring it against Aristotelian standards. Another purpose of mine is to question the division of tasks classically accepted in the history of ancient ethics, which makes Plato a philosopher exclusively concerned with erōs and Aristotle the first philosopher to have placed philia at the heart of our moral life.
Dialogue tout entier consacré à l’amour (erōs), le Phèdre de Platon comprend des enseignements décisifs sur le traitement platonicien de l’amitié (philia). L’un de ces enseignements est qu’en dépit du contexte général du dialogue qui pose la question de l’amitié dans le cadre des relations homoérotiques, Platon, non moins qu’Aristote, distingue des formes, ou types, d’amitié et établit entre elles une hiérarchie au regard de l’excellence (aretē). Pour s’en convaincre, il faut commencer par lire le discours sur l’amour (erōtikos) de Lysias (Phèdre, 231a-234c) non comme un document sans intérêt philosophique, mais comme le lieu où Platon expose une conception de la philia qu’il rejette avec force et à laquelle il va opposer un modèle alternatif de relation amicale dans le reste du dialogue. On est ainsi amené à nuancer la division des tâches classiquement admise dans l’histoire de l’éthique ancienne, qui fait de Platon un philosophe exclusivement préoccupé par l’erōs et d’Aristote le premier philosophe à avoir inscrit la philia au cœur de notre vie morale.
