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2021
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.3fc340...
- halshs: halshs-02922012
- doi: 10.1146/annurev-economics-081720-114422
- WOS: 000685106100004
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1146/annurev-economics-081720-114422
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Bundling Quadratic voting Logrolling Vote trading Storable votes Vote markets logrolling vote trading storable votes quadratic voting bundling vote markets D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General/D.D0.D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D47 - Market Design D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D70 - General D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design P - Economic Systems/P.P1 - Capitalist Systems/P.P1.P16 - Political EconomySujets proches
Public markets Methods of analysis Analysis and chemistry Analytical methods Chemical analysis Analysis methods Analysis and examinationCiter ce document
Alessandra Casella et al., « Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare? », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1146/annurev-economics-081720-114422
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Résumé
Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, acquiring others' votes when preferences are strong in exchange for giving votes away when preferences are weak. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? For a practice long believed to be central to collective decisions, the lack of a clear answer is surprising. We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling - the exchange of votes for votes. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions - to trade votes with oneself only. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions.
