On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
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- handle: 10670/1.3i3eya
- halshs: halshs-00869873
- doi: 10.1515/bejte-2012-0028
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1515/bejte-2012-0028
Mots-clés
Nash implementation partial honesty single-peaked preferences single-plateaued preferences single-dipped preferences C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • AssociationsSujets proches
Legislative committees Amusements Choice, Social Public choice Collective choice Negotiations Bargaining Haggling Negotiating Higgling Dickering Dishonesty Article Children--Recreation Games for children Pastimes Primitive games Recreations Games, Primitive Children's games Games, Theory of Theory of games Funds Funding Bargaining Labor negotiations Agency (Philosophy) Agents Person (Philosophy) Finance, commerce, confiscations, etc Methods of analysis Analysis and chemistry Analytical methods Chemical analysis Analysis methods Analysis and examination Clubs divertissement jeuxCiter ce document
Ahmed Doghmi et al., « On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1515/bejte-2012-0028
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Résumé
In this article, we study the problem of Nash implementation in private good economies with single-peaked, single-plateaued, and single-dipped preferences in the presence of at least one minimally honest agent. We prove that all solutions of the problem of fair division satisfying unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria as long as there are at least three agents participating in the mechanism (game form). To justify this result, we provide a list of solutions which violate the condition of no-veto power.