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2016
- handle: 10670/1.3itulc
- hal: hal-01253632
Mots-clés
bank regulation market discipline moral hazard contagion G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G21 - Banks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G28 - Government Policy and RegulationSujets proches
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Lucyna Anna Gornicka et al., « Too-International-to-Fail? Supranational Bank Resolution and Market Discipline », HAL-SHS : droit et gestion, ID : 10670/1.3itulc
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Résumé
Supranational resolution of insolvent banks does not necessarily improve welfare. Supranational regulators are more inclined to bail-out banks indebted towards international creditors because they take into account cross-border contagion. When banks' creditors are more likely to be bailed out, market discipline decreases and risk-taking by indebted banks increases. Depending on the trade-off between giving the right incentives ex ante and limiting contagion ex post, both a national and a supranational resolution framework can be optimal. In particular, if market discipline is low under both national and supranational resolution mechanisms, supranational resolution improves welfare as it stimulates interbank trade.