Fiche du document
- handle: 10670/1.3k9pcp
- halshs: halshs-04156082
- doi: 10.1016/j.finmar.2023.100819
- WOS: 001009274000001
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.finmar.2023.100819
Mots-clés
Central counter-party Central clearing Dealers Collateral G - Financial Economics/G.G1 - General Financial Markets/G.G1.G18 - Government Policy and Regulation G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G20 - General G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G23 - Non-bank Financial Institutions • Financial Instruments • Institutional Investors G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G33 - Bankruptcy • LiquidationSujets proches
Financial intermediaries Lending institutionsCiter ce document
Gabrielle Demange et al., « On the choice of central counterparties in the EU », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.finmar.2023.100819
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Résumé
We study competition between European Union’s Central CounterParties (CCPs) on the credit default swap (CDS) market. Using data on market shares, we show that CCPs have a monopoly for single-name CDSs and compete on indices along various dimensions. Using transactions data, we focus on the major dealers who alternatively clear their transactions on the two main CCPs. Estimating their choice of CCP reveals that fees, CCPs’ robustness and activity, dealers’ risk, and market volatility are significant. Dealers’ positions indicate that saving on collateral costs is secondary relative to the benefits of dual membership and quality.