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2023
- handle: 10670/1.3nsl8k
- hal: hal-03924664
- doi: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2022.10.003
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jeconom.2022.10.003
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Econometrics of Auctions Endogenous Matching Polychotomous Sample Selection Price-performance Elasticity C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C3 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models • Multiple Variables/C.C3.C34 - Truncated and Censored Models • Switching Regression Models C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C5 - Econometric Modeling/C.C5.C57 - Econometrics of Games and Auctions D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D44 - Auctions M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M5 - Personnel Economics/M.M5.M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects Z - Other Special Topics/Z.Z2 - Sports Economics/Z.Z2.Z22 - Labor IssuesSujets proches
Earnings Wage rates Wage-fund Departmental salaries Remuneration Pay Salaries Compensation Working class--Wages Dutch auctions VenduesCiter ce document
Laurent Lamy et al., « Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jeconom.2022.10.003
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Résumé
This paper develops a novel approach to estimate how contract and principal-agent characteristics influence a post-auction outcome when the matching between agents and principals derives from an auction process. We propose a control-function approach to account jointly for the endogeneity of contracts and matching. This consists of, first, estimating the primitives of an interdependent values auction model-which is shown to be non-parametrically identified from the bidding data-second, constructing control functions based on the distribution of the unobserved private signals conditional on the auction outcome. A Monte Carlo study shows that our augmented outcome equation corrects the endogeneity biases well, even in small samples. We apply our methodology to a labor market application and estimate the effect of sports players' auction-determined wages on their individual performances. We also use our structural estimates to evaluate the strength of matching inefficiencies and assess counterfactual reservation wage policies.