Threshold of Preference for Collusion and Interconnection Fees in Different Market Structures : the Tunisian Mobile Market Case
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25 février 2013
- handle: 10670/1.3wbja3
- halshs: halshs-00794286
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Interconnexion fees Collusion Market Structure Private sector Public Sector Tunisian Mobile Market D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D40 - General L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization/L.L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy/L.L5.L51 - Economics of Regulation L - Industrial Organization/L.L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities/L.L9.L96 - TelecommunicationsSujets proches
Industrial economics Market structureCiter ce document
Sami Debbichi et al., « Threshold of Preference for Collusion and Interconnection Fees in Different Market Structures : the Tunisian Mobile Market Case », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.3wbja3
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Résumé
We present a Cournot model that compares the critical threshold of collusion in Duopoly and Oligopoly Markets where the actors are private, mixed or public. We assume that the incentive critical threshold for collusion depends on the interconnection fees. The different threshold values calculated in each Market structure are then estimated, using the OLS method, with variables related to the Tunisian market structures and prices. The Econometric estimation of the different threshold values is consistent with our theoretical results. Our findings can be used by the decision makers to control collusion, by acting on the level of interconnection fees for each market structure and by implementing the suitable market liberalization policies in this sector.