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- handle: 10670/1.3xepkn
- hal: hal-03579836
- doi: 10.1057/fp.2011.5
- SCIENCESPO: 2441/fvtnkmt15tlkfv89pacr010k8
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/2441/fvtnkmt15tlkfv89pacr010k8
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Richard Nadeau et al., « Assets and Risk: A Neglected Dimension of Economic Voting », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10.1057/fp.2011.5
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Résumé
Economic voting studies have been dominated by the classic reward–punishment paradigm, in which voters vote for the incumbent under goodeconomic performance, but against under bad. This paradigm works well whenthe economic issue is a valence issue, such as prosperity. However, it leaves outpositional economic voting, in which thevoter’s place in the economic structureinfluences policy preference, and thusparty preference. More precisely, wesuggest that the better the economic location of voters in terms of assets, high-risk assets in particular, the more they will vote right, because the right promisesa better return on their investments. We demonstrate this effect in Frenchpresidential election data, from three national surveys – 1988, 1995 and 2002.This assets effect well exceeds other economic effects tested, and does so understrong statistical controls.