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1 septembre 2020
- handle: 10670/1.416a41
- hal: hal-03109922
- doi: 10.5547/01956574.41.SI1.lgir
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.5547/01956574.41.SI1.lgir
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Energy efficiency Imperfect competition Information asymmetry Internal and external compliance. D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization/L.L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior/L.L2.L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure L - Industrial Organization/L.L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities/L.L9.L94 - Electric Utilities Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q4 - Energy/Q.Q4.Q41 - Demand and Supply • Prices -fin]Sujets proches
Energy resources Power supply Energy Energy Conservation of energy Correlation of forces EnergyCiter ce document
Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet et al., « Selling and Saving Energy: Energy Efficiency Obligations in Liberalized Energy Markets », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.5547/01956574.41.SI1.lgir
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Résumé
In Europe, energy efficiency obligations are imposed on energy retailers competing in liberalized energy markets. They comply by subsidizing energy efficiency investments made by energy end-users within or outside their customer base. We develop a model describing how competition in the energy market affects compliance strategies. We find that, instead of selecting the most cost-effective investments options, firms may either target their most elastic customers, which enables them to increase their retail price, or their competitor’s customers, which protects their sales. Allowing firms to trade obligations can restore cost-effectiveness, but reduces consumer surplus. Overall, the degree of flexibility that should be incorporated into such programs crucially depends on the degree of heterogeneity across investment costs and the relative weights governments assign to cost-effectiveness and consumer surplus.