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- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.4d3060...
- hal: hal-04056498
- doi: 10.1111/misp.12072
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Uriah Kriegel, « Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1111/misp.12072
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Résumé
A prominent view of phenomenal consciousness combines two claims: (i) theidentity conditions of phenomenally conscious states can be fully accounted for interms of these states’ representational content; (ii) this representational content canbe fully accounted for in non-phenomenal terms. This paper presents an argumentagainst this view. The core idea is that the identity conditions of phenomenallyconscious states are not fixed entirely by what these states represent (theirrepresentational contents), but depend in part on how they represent (theirrepresentational attitudes or modes). The argument highlights the myriad liabilitiesand difficulties one must accrue if she tries to appeal only to what phenomenallyconscious states represent in accounting for their phenomenal individuation.
