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1 juillet 2022
- handle: 10670/1.4ifqs1
- hal: hal-03921232
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Rival Opportunity Sharing Network Communication Investment C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: TheorySujets proches
Communication, Primitive Mass communicationCiter ce document
Mohamed Belhaj et al., « Do people share opportunities? », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.4ifqs1
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Résumé
A set of agents is aware of the existence of an economic opportunity, and compete for the associated prize. We study incentives to communicate about the existence of this economic opportunity to uninformed agents when the winner of the prize shares it with others, through some exogenous sharing rule. Communicating about the opportunity has two conflicting effects: it increases competition, but it can also increase the likelihood of receiving a large share of the prize. We find that, for any sharing rule, there is a minimum equilibrium, which Pareto dominates all other equilibria. We also find that under bilaterally symmetric sharing, more sharing generates more communication. We then discuss these results along several extensions.