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2017
- handle: 10670/1.4zimem
- isbn: 978-3-319-52653-9
- hal: hal-01512621
- doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_10
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_10
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Location Equilibrium Hotelling games Large games Poisson games Valence C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics/R.R3 - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location/R.R3.R30 - General R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics/R.R3 - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location/R.R3.R39 - OtherSujets proches
Amusements Real property--Law and legislation Catastral surveys Real estate law Cadastral surveys Realty Property, Real Freehold Real estate Limitations (Law) Children--Recreation Games for children Pastimes Primitive games Recreations Games, Primitive Children's gamesCiter ce document
Matias Nunez et al., « Large Spatial Competition », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_10
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Résumé
We consider spatial competition when consumers are arbitrarily distributed on a compact metric space. Retailers can choose one of finitely many locations in this space. We focus on symmetric mixed equilibria which exist for any number of retailers. We prove that the distribution of retailers tends to agree with the distribution of the consumers when the number of competitors is large enough. The results are shown to be robust to the introduction of (i) randomness in the number of retailers and (ii) different ability of the retailers to attract consumers.