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- handle: 10670/1.5cnj33
- hal: hal-01022731
- doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.005
- SCIENCESPO: 2441/10267
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.005
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/2441/10267
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
D - Microeconomics/D.D2 - Production and Organizations/D.D2.D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory D - Microeconomics/D.D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium/D.D5.D52 - Incomplete Markets D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting BehaviorSujets proches
Polls Public markets Balancing (Physics) Balance (Physics) BalanceCiter ce document
Hervé Crès et al., « Production in incomplete markets: Expectations matter for political stability », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.005
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Résumé
In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear-quadratic setup we show that the endogenization of voting weights (given by portfolio holdings) can give rise to - through self-fulfilling expectations - dramatical political instability, i.e. Condorcet cycles of length two even for very high majority rules.