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2021
- handle: 10670/1.5fx76h
- hal: hal-03515749
- doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102735
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102735
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Nonlinear pricing Oligopoly Asymmetric information Linear pricing Informational frictions D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism DesignSujets proches
Price policy, Industrial Retail pricing Price policy Shoppers Customers (Consumers) Businesses Firms Companies Enterprises Business organizations Organizations, BusinessCiter ce document
Daniel F. Garrett et al., « Oligopoly under incomplete information: on the welfare effects of price discrimination », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102735
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Résumé
We study competition by firms that simultaneously post (potentially nonlinear) taris to consumers who are privately informed about their tastes. Market power stems from informational frictions, in that consumers are heterogeneously informed about firms' oers. In the absence of regulation, all firms oer quantity discounts. As a result, relative to Bertrand pricing, imperfect competition benefits disproportionately more consumers whose willingness to pay is high, rather than low. Regulation imposing linear pricing hurts the former but benefits the latter consumers. While consumer surplus increases, firms' profits decrease, enough to drive down utilitarian welfare. By contrast, improvements in market transparency increase utilitarian welfare, and achieve similar gains on consumer surplus as imposing linear pricing, although with limited distributive impact. On normative grounds, our analysis suggests that banning price discrimination is warranted only if its distributive benefits have a weight on the societal objective.